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ABSTRACT  
Whilst Australia has signed both the UN Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, and the Kyoto Protocol, it has failed to ratify the latter.  It is nevertheless committed 
to meeting its +8% Kyoto target for greenhouse gas emissions, and argues that it is on track to 
doing so. This paper examines Australia's non-ratification politics and greenhouse policy 
efforts in an attempt to explain its contrary position of resisting Kyoto, yet embracing and 
pursuing its emission reduction targets.  Australia's behaviour as a carbon intensive nation is 
highly significant in the global context, and this paper focuses on the domestic factors of 
interests, ideas and institutions, while also considering international factors in trying to 
explain Australia's non-ratification of Kyoto and climate change policy development.  It finds 
that whilst ideas and institutions have been modifying influences in the domestic context, 
political and economic interests have dominated Australia's greenhouse policy. 
 
                                                
1 The Weyerhaeuser Foundation has supported this project thanks to the efforts of Kathryn Harrison of the 
University of British Columbia for which the author is most grateful.  The author wishes to thank the editors of 
this collection for their suggestions and editing, and the reviewers for their supportive feedback. 
 Is Australia Faking It? (2) Crowley final 
 
It is not in Australia's interests to ratify the Kyoto Protocol.  The 
reason it is not in Australia's interests to ratify the Kyoto 
Protocol is that, because the arrangements currently exclude - 
and are likely under present settings to continue to exclude - both 
developing countries and the United States, for us to ratify the 
protocol would cost us jobs and damage our industry.  That is 
why the Australian Government will continue to oppose 
ratification (Prime Minister John Howard).2 
 
 
 
Introduction 
This article examines why Australia has failed to ratify the Kyoto Protocol yet still claims to 
be pursuing its Kyoto target of an 8% increase in greenhouse gas emissions above 1990 
levels.  Australia will only meet its +8% target by the end of the first commitment period by 
relying on once off generous land use accounting rules that it negotiated in Kyoto.  Even with 
these accounting rules, Australia claims that its +8% target will still prove onerous because, if 
it is achieved, it will represent a 17% cut, in estimated 'business-as-usual' (BAU) emissions, 
from 690 to 603 Mt Co2-e by 2010.3  This article will examine the policies and measures that 
are in place with the intention of achieving this cut, and the arguments of critics as to their 
likely effectiveness.4   Australia has chosen not to ratify Kyoto because of the cost of cutting 
energy emissions that would be required in the second commitment period when its generous 
land use concessions would no longer apply.  It is thus avoiding the job loss and damage to 
the fossil fuel industry that it anticipates would follow ratification and energy industry 
restructuring.  On the other hand, Australia is strongly committed to pursuing its Kyoto target 
over the first commitment period because significant changes in land use from 1990, 
including the halting of land clearance, will entirely offset steeply rising energy emissions.  
This article argues that Australia is therefore faking its commitment to meeting its target by 
not cutting energy emissions and by relying on land use change and ineffective voluntary and 
spending programs to meet its Kyoto and BAU targets. 
                                                
2 Howard, 2002, 3163. 
3 See Table One.  Note that Baumgartenr and Midttun (1987) advise caution in using business as usual 
projections, which they argue are based on uncertainty and are inevitably influenced by perceptions, hopes and 
political objectives. 
4 Commonwealth 2000, ANAO 2004. 
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There has been considerable analysis of Australia's self interest as a global player on 
the Kyoto stage, and some analysis of its poorly targeted, ineffective abatement policies,5 
however this paper focuses on the less explored link between the two, between non-
ratification and domestic climate policies.  It therefore employs a theoretical framework that 
draws on both international relations and comparative politics theory.  An examination of 
Australia's failure to ratify Kyoto is significant because it is one of only two developed 
nations that has not ratified, and timely, as Australia joins the rush of nations attempting to 
define the post-Kyoto period.  It is also instructive for exploring the factors behind Australia's 
position on Kyoto, which resembles the United States' non-ratification, but which differs 
significantly at the domestic level.  The focus here is upon the 1997-2007 decade, which 
coincides with Australia's signing of Kyoto in 1997, and the launching of Australia's 
greenhouse policy efforts under the Howard government the next year.  This government has 
been in power continuously since 1996, and has had a consistent policy of non-ratification 
and of promoting action that has not addressed the greenhouse implications of Australia's 
fossil fuel dependency.  Australia has been much criticised for its self-interested behaviour on 
the international stage,6 however this paper argues that self-interest at this level only partially 
explains its actions. 
 This paper combines discussion and analysis of the Kyoto Protocol, its ratification and 
its domestic policy challenges, by addressing both the international and the national context.  
It brings a domestic perspective to this global issue with its consideration of the roles of 
electoral interests, normative influences and institutional context and capacity in its analysis.  
It argues that Australia's non-ratification has withstood both international and domestic 
criticism, but that this criticism has prompted the limited policy efforts that the government 
has made to date.  The legitimacy and effectiveness of these efforts in reducing emissions is 
therefore critical to determining whether or not Australia is 'faking it'.7  The paper reviews 
Australia's case for increasing emissions before tracking Australia's path at the international 
level to non-ratification and examining its domestic policy.  It finds that public concern and 
minor party influence in the Senate have only slightly modified policy, which fossil fuel 
industry interests have dominated.  In normative terms, economic rationalism at home and a 
rejection of multilateralism abroad have driven policy, whilst ecological modernisation 
                                                
5 See for example Hamilton, 2001; Lowe, 2004; and Macdonald, 2005a on the former and ANAO, 2004; Lyster, 
2004 and Pollard, 2003 on the latter. 
6 Victor, 2006, 3. 
7 I owe 'Faking It' as a concept to http://www.greenpeace.org.au/climate/reports/Faking_It_Final.pdf. 
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principles have failed to impact.8  The paper also notes that Australia is currently reaching a 
tipping point on climate change thanks to heightened global and domestic influences, and that 
the government's entrenched political and policy position of the last decade may shift as a 
consequence. 
 
 
Australia as a Special Case?  
Australia is a carbon-intensive economy, with coal its largest export, and dominating 
electricity production, and many of its other exports having high associated greenhouse gas 
emission levels.  It has the highest net greenhouse gas emissions among industrialised nations 
at 27.5 tonnes per person, 32% higher than the US and double the OECD average, albeit 
responsible for only 3.9% of the emissions of industrialised countries, or about 1.4% of global 
emissions.  At Kyoto in 1997, Australia negotiated an 8% increase in emissions above 1990 
levels by 2008-12, which as mentioned still represents a significant cut over time in business 
as usual emissions.  It also negotiated the so-called 'Australia clause', stipulated in Article 3.7 
of the Protocol, which allows any country with net land clearing in 1990 to include the 
equivalent emissions in its baseline.9  Australia was the only Annex 1 country to benefit from 
this clause with easy credits yielded towards its Kyoto target from the net land clearing it was 
experiencing in 1990 and the significant drop in clearing thereafter.  Without this, Australia's 
emissions would currently stand at 25% over 1990 levels, however with this concession they 
stand at only 4%, showing the extent to which halting land clearing helps in meeting 
Australia's Kyoto target.  In fact energy emissions are rapidly accelerating and will continue 
to do so, whilst land clearance has plummeted from record levels in 1990.10   
Any depiction of Australia internationally as a self-interested state in terms of its 
position on the Kyoto Protocol needs to examine its claim to special case status amongst 
developed nations, the so-called Annex 1 countries.  Australia's special case argument rests on 
several grounds: its heavy reliance on fossil fuels for energy, the transport issues associated 
with its size as the sixth largest country in the world, its above OECD average population 
                                                
8 Dryzek, 1997. 
9 Australia is the only developed nation still clearing land, indeed only Brazil, Indonesia, Sudan, Zambia, and 
Mexico clear more land each year than Australia does.  Land clearing causes both waste gases and changes in 
surface reflectivity that contribute to global warming, and its cessation is essential to maintaining biological 
carbon storage; Pittock, 2005, 187; ACF, 2001. 
10 See Table One where the fall is anticipated to be from 129Mt Co2-e in 1990 to 24 Mt Co2-e to 2010. The 
Australia Institute has questioned the accuracy of this figure in "Cooking the Greenhouse Books," On-Line 
Opinion, 2 March 2007 at http://www.onlineopinion.com.au. 
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growth, its still changing land use patterns and its export-based economy.11  Australia is also a 
'new world' economy - new in the sense that it's economy is only two hundred years old, and 
'new world' in the sense of its Asia Pacific location and strong trading ties with East Asian 
nations.  These include ties with developing nations that are exempt from the first 
commitment period, so that Australia's trade competitiveness would suffer if the costs of 
production increased while those of its trading partners did not.12  Australia's reliance on coal 
for power is double the OECD average at 85%,13 best paralleled by China's reliance at 67.7%.  
These countries share a self-interested defence of coal-based energy despite sustained 
international criticism, and in Australia's case a greenhouse policy context that is highly 
protective of the fossil fuel industry.14 
Much of Australia's special case argument also applies to Canada, which did not 
follow Australia in arguing for increased emissions.15  Australia rested its case on the 
principle of differentiation, or the need for special treatment, although it rejects the 
application of this principle in other circumstances, that is to developing countries or 
internally within Europe.16 The successful pursuit of increased emissions and accounting 
concessions marks Australia as self-interested, and sets the stage for this paper's consideration 
of the legitimacy of its domestic policy efforts.  Will domestic economic interests and 
protection of the fossil fuel industry undermine climate change policy as national self-interest 
has its international negotiations, and could Australia thus lay itself open to a charge of faking 
its entire greenhouse gas abatement effort?  Critics point to Australia's land clearing 
concession as an atypical gain from the Kyoto negotiations that would see less policy effort 
required to reign in emissions to meet its target.  This significant win was extracted under 
threat of walking away from negotiations and is perhaps matched only by Russia's hot-air 
windfall from the collapse of Soviet industrialism.  Oberthur and Ott describe these two 
countries, neither of which are Kyoto enthusiasts, as the main Kyoto winners.17 
Both Australia and the US see the Kyoto Protocol as a threat to their economies.  This 
should not be the case for Australia in the first commitment period, with its reliance on land 
clearing concessions, but it would require energy emission cuts in the second commitment 
                                                
11 AGO, 2005a, 1-2. 
12 Roarty, 2002,7 
13 Macdonald, 2005a, 226. 
14 Heggelund and Andresen, 2006. 
15 Harrison, this issue. 
16 Schreurs and Tibeghien, this issue. 
17 Hamilton and Reynolds, 1998, 12; Hamilton 2007, 77; Oberthur and Ott, 1999, 137; see also Henry and 
Sundstrom this issue.  
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period.  On the other hand, government attempts already in train to cut emissions below BAU, 
if they are to prove effective, should see abatement costs as less of a deterrence post 2012.  
Again as critics have claimed, the cost of not acting on global warming is not something the 
government has considered, neither is the cost of acting early to lessen cost in the longer term, 
nor is the cost of being excluded from global carbon trading and other Kyoto mechanisms.18  
Australia has also never explored energy efficiency given its abundant supplies of fossil fuel 
and could readily achieve abatement in this area at relatively little cost.  If fuel is wastefully 
used as it is in Australia, Clive Hamilton explains, it will cost less to reduce consumption.19  
In failing to effectively cut emissions now, Australia is not well positioned post 2012.  While 
the details of requirements upon partners in the second commitment period are yet to be 
negotiated, emission cuts will be the key objective.  If Australia does ratify in the next round, 
perhaps because of a change in government, it will have used up its land clearing windfall, it 
would need to deeply cut energy emissions, and it may suffer a penalty, for not ratifying 
earlier, of having to reduce emissions by an extra 30% beyond 2012.20 
 
 
Framing Non-Ratification and Policy Implementation  
The framework of analysis here is concerned with explaining domestic decisions and policy 
efforts that are set within an international context, specifically with implications for the 
establishment, operation and future of the Kyoto Protocol.  Australia's rejection of Kyoto is 
less significant than the US rejection, however it has symbolic significance on the 
international and domestic stages that is evident in the rhetoric accompanying domestic 
policy-making.  The international and domestic are entwined, as critical normative pressure 
has been felt from other nations, from transnational non-governmental organisations and 
scientific communities within and outside Australia, as well as from economic, trade and 
industry imperatives.  Australia's relations with the US are significant in this mix, but this 
should not be overstated because there is with Kyoto a fortuitous alignment of Australia's 
economic self-interest and its political relations with the US that suits Australia's non-
ratification politics.  Whilst Australia is a ready follower of the US for reasons of culture, 
history, identity and values21 it is also motivated on a pragmatic level by seeking practical 
                                                
18 See for example Hunt 2004 and Pittock, 2005. 
19 Hamilton, 2007, 47; Pittock, 2005, 260. 
20 Hunt, 2004, 162. 
21 Macdonald, 2005b. 
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outcomes for Australia's benefit.22  These are tightly prescribed in the case of climate change 
by Australia's export economy, the dominance of coal in its domestic energy production, and 
by Australia's position as the world's largest coal exporter. 
 
Electoral Interests 
Climate change has consistently rated as an issue of concern, in 1997 to 90% of Australians, 
in 2003 to 78% of Australians, and in 2007 with Australians more worried about it than any 
other global issue, and more worried about it than any other nation in the world.  At critical 
periods, Australians have also shown high levels of support for the Kyoto Protocol.  In 1997, 
80% of Australians believed that Australia should sign Kyoto, and in 2001, 80% of 
Australians believed that it should ratify without the United States if necessary.23  However, 
climate change has not dominated federal politics until recently, and the Howard government 
has run the fossil fuel industry24 line of not ratifying. A blurring of government-industry 
boundaries has taken place: in particular the drafting and managing of policy, the funding of 
the research into the cost of abatement, and the inclusion of industry on official international 
delegations. 25 Environmental organisations and alternate energy lobby groups do not enjoy 
the favour, inside knowledge or connections of the fossil fuel lobby.26  It is not likely, given 
the polls, that Australians have been persuaded that by aiming to meet its Kyoto target, the 
government was acting on climate change, but it is possible and it may explain electoral 
quiescence.  Certainly the government has tried to assuage the public by promising to meet its 
Kyoto target, with the accompanying proviso that jobs and the economy are its first priority.  
The government has been greatly criticised for its close relations with the fossil fuel industry.   
The Labor opposition has meanwhile been remarkably inept on climate change, 
hampered by its links to coal unions and thus internal conflicts, for example over energy 
futures and whether or not to pursue nuclear power.  Labor has also been generally inept in 
opposing the Howard government over the last decade, with its ongoing leadership tensions 
                                                
22 Lightfoot, 2006, 459; Elliott 2001, 268. 
23 Hamilton, 2007, 69, 209; see The Sydney Morning Herald, 26 November 1997, p. 1; The Australian's 
Newspoll Research Greenhouse Gas, 2001; and BBC World Service, '19 Nation Poll on Energy’, July 2006; 
News Limited, "Climate Change the No. 1 Concern for Australians," Media release, 17 January 2007. 
24 In particular, the Australian Industry Greenhouse Network, comprising industries such as coal, electricity, 
aluminium, petroleum, minerals and cement is argued to have had undue influence over government policy. 
25Hamilton 2001, 2006; Lowe 2004; Papadakis 2002; Lyster 2004, 565; Commonwealth Ombudsman, 1998; 
Cohen, Janine. 2006. The Greenhouse Mafia.  Transcript of a Four Corners investigative journalism program 
broadcast on Monday 13 February, by the Australian Broadcasting Corporation [see http://www.abc.net.au]. 
26 Hamilton 2006, 14; 2007, 130.  Environmental groups include the Australian Conservation Foundation, 
Greenpeace, and the World Wildlife Fund for Nature.  Pro-Kyoto business groups include Environment Business 
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and changes.  The government has made an art form of failing to reflect public concern and of 
dividing the nation using 'wedge tactics' on contentious issues, and Labor has failed to 
convincingly argue alternatives.27  But Labor today under new leadership reflects public 
sentiment by supporting the ratification of Kyoto, the introduction of domestic emissions 
trading and an increase in the mandatory renewable energy target.  Australia has likely now 
reached a tipping point on climate change, which may even decide the upcoming federal 
election.  Long held public concerns have heightened following the release of the film An 
Inconvenient Truth, the Stern Review of climate change economics, the support of trade 
unions for emissions trading, and of faith-based communities for early action on climate 
change as a moral imperative.  Australia is also in the grip of a 'thousand year' drought with 
crop failures, water shortages and devastating bush fires across the country, with talk of 
environmental refugees from the Pacific fleeing rising sea levels.28  In 2007, 74% of 
respondents were not satisfied with the government on climate change, 74% favored a carbon 
tax, and 77% did not trust the government on environmental issues.29 
 
Ideas 
Whilst these electoral circumstances are significant, the government has succeeded in 
maintaining its non-ratification position, its protection of the fossil fuel industry, and its 
failure to address energy emissions for over a decade.  Economic rationalism and climate 
change scepticism has been the normative justification for policy, completely overwhelming 
any counter arguments from environmentalists since the Howard government was first 
elected.  The critical normative divides that have been witnessed in that time over climate 
change have concerned the free market, the role of science, ethics and morality.  
Economically rational policy making and free market ideology have certainly dominated as 
the language of the business community, the fossil fuel lobby, and Australia's Asian Pacific 
neighbours, the US in particular, in contrast to the European language of regulation.  In 
Australia, the fossil fuel industry lobby's influence conveniently aligns with the government's 
conservative politics and its coalition partner's30 natural resource industry interests, so it is 
expected that policy on climate change would reflect industry concern.  But there have been 
                                                                                                                                                   
Australia, the Renewable and Sustainable Energy Roundtable, the Australian Business Council for Sustainable 
Energy, the Australian Wind Energy Association, and the Australian Business Roundtable on Climate Change. 
27 Manne, 2004. 
28 Smith and Hargroves, 2007, 16-17. 
29 News Limited, "Climate Change the No. 1 Concern for Australians," Media release, 17 January 2007. 
30 The Howard government's coalition partner is the National Party (previously known as the Country Party). 
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other significant normative factors including debates between scientists and scientific 
sceptics, and the advocates and critics of moral behaviour.31 
Self-declared scepticism about global warming has been a critical defining feature of 
the Howard government's approach to climate change, more recently re-fashioned by the 
Prime Minister as climate change realism, which he defines as not being driven by fanaticism 
or global imperatives.  Given the high level of climate change scientific expertise in the 
country and the considerable influence of this science upon public opinion, the political 
influence of scepticism or realism is surprising.  It may also prove to be increasingly 
untenable as a defining influence for government policy.  Whilst scepticism has dominated 
the conservative press, and has influenced policy, as it has done in the US, it has been 
increasingly undermined in Australia by reports and research by government bodies, the 
scientific elite and growing international evidence.  Indeed the Prime Minister is one of the 
few remaining climate change sceptics within his own government.32 
In normative terms there have also been some significant additional debates about 
ethical issues, with arguments over whether non-ratification is a wrong-headed act of moral 
cowardice or not, and the environmental justice implications of Australia's behaviour, debates 
which have been enormously influenced by international pressures and opinion.33  However 
there has also been significant debate about Kyoto's global utility as an effective emissions 
abatement mechanism that intensified in the lead up to the Protocol coming into force for 
ratifying parties in 2005.  The Howard government argued that Kyoto is dead34 without the 
participation of the US and developing nations in the first commitment period, and advocated 
instead a regional, trade-based, self-regulatory alternative to Kyoto's more European global, 
moral, regulatory style.  This argument suits its embrace of regionalism and economic 
rationalism, its protection of the fossil fuel industry and its rejection of multilateral and 
regulatory approaches to emissions abatement. 
 
Institutions 
The critical institutional issues for politics and policy effectiveness in Australia are the 
systems of federalism and of bicameralism, as well as the proportional electoral system in the 
                                                
31 See Kellow, 1998; Hamilton, 2001; and Macdonald, 2005a. 
32 See the Four Corners program What Price Will You Pay To Avert Climate Change produced by Jonathan 
Holmes shown by the Australian Broadcasting Commission August 28th 2006. 
33 See Lowe, 2004. 
34 Hamilton, 2007, 170. 
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Senate.35 The federal government has no explicit environmental powers, although power has 
been conferred by the High Court when adjudicating federal-state environmental disputes.36  
The states own their natural resources and rely upon resource exploitation, so that their 
support of Kyoto and emissions abatement is not at the expense of the coal industry.  If there 
were a federal government attempting to institute abatement measures that did require action 
by states, developers and industry, it could insert an enabling trigger in the Environment 
Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act that would be supported in the High Court.  It is 
through this Act that the federal government has been attempting to influence the halting of 
land clearing, which previously was the sole preserve of the states and local government in 
terms of approvals. 
Federalism enables the states to innovate on emissions abatement where the federal 
government has been recalcitrant, but it also allows the federal government to achieve 
cooperation with the states as a condition of the funding of state programs.  State are highly 
reliant upon the redistribution of taxation funds which are increasingly tied to specific 
purposes determined predominantly at the federal level.  Instances of state greenhouse gas 
regulation include the creation of carbon rights in terms of ownership, sale and management 
rights, internal mandatory emissions trading schemes with reduction targets,37 legislation 
controlling land clearing, and greenhouse gas environment protection requirements from 
developers.  Three states have regulated to promote renewable energy, Queensland requiring 
13% of power sold or used to be gas, Victoria requiring 10% of power sold or used to be 
renewable by 2010, and South Australia requiring 20% of power sold or used to be renewable 
by 2014. 
Australia's bicameral system of government follows the British in terms of 
parliamentary government, and the American in terms of its federalist structure and elected 
Senate.  Since 1949, the Senate has been elected by proportional representation.  With 
different electoral systems for the House and Senate, it is unusual for one party to dominate 
government.38  The House and Senate enjoy equal law making powers with approval of both 
required to pass legislation.  This has enabled the government to defeat climate change 
legislation moved by minor parties in the Senate.  The Australian Greens have used their 
Senate presence to introduce failed legislation such as the Convention on Climate Change 
(Implementation) Bill 1999, and the Kyoto Protocol Ratification Bill 2002.  And the 
                                                
35 See Parkin and Summers, 2002, 7-14. 
36 Fenna, 1998, 90-1. 
37 The states are also supportive of a national scheme. 
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Australian Democrats have used their balance of power in the Senate to negotiate abatement 
programs, renewable power and alternative fuel programs in exchange for supporting the 
federal goods and services tax.39  Minor parties may gain a foothold in the Senate, and may 
introduce legislation, but their influence is limited to occasions where the government is 
forced to negotiate with them, or where they hold the balance of power. 
The Australian Greenhouse Office (AGO), the Australian National Audit Office and 
the Australian Bureau of Statistics provide critical institutional support for climate change 
policy.  The latter two are independent, and provide information checks and balances, whilst 
the AGO is subject to the government's own normative and interest-based influences and less 
impartial on a politicised issue like climate change.  The AGO has centralised climate change 
policy, lessening interdepartmental rivalry that Japan, for example, has seen between its 
environment, economic and trade agencies,40 and has thus achieved a reinforcing and 
entrenching of government policy.  This has also undermined the influence of other agencies 
where their functions have been lost to the AGO.  The AGO is charged with Australia's 
UNFCCC reporting and with satisfying domestic and international audiences that Australia is 
meeting its Kyoto target.  The historical pathway to the establishment of this target and efforts 
to meet it are described below with national self-interest dominating Australia's non-
ratification politics in the international domain. 
 
 
Australia Fails to Ratify Kyoto  
The temporal shift in Australia's position on climate change is striking, from aspiring global 
leader in the 1980s under the leadership of Labor Prime Minister Bob Hawke, to globally 
isolated laggard a decade later under the conservative coalition of Prime Minister John 
Howard.41  Over this time, Australia's carefully crafted position as honest, international 
environmental broker which Labor had shaped for over a decade, has been reshaped to a 
position of blocking strong international action and seeking lowest common denominator 
outcomes.42  Australia has shifted decisively, in normative terms, from multilateralist to 
unilateralist, contemplating cooperation only within a self-interested regional context.  
However, in the late 1980s, Australia was not simply acting as an advocate of global citizenry 
                                                                                                                                                   
38 The Howard government did gain a rare majority in the House and the Senate following 2004 elections. 
39 CWLTH, 2004, 58. 
40 Tiberghien and Scheurs, this issue. 
41 Hamilton, 2001; Christoff, 1998. 
42 Lightfoot, 2006, 458-9. 
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and cooperation, but as a leader in attempts to redress the greenhouse problem.43  Indeed, 
Prime Minister Hawke was an early leader in the charismatic 'new labour' style, which later 
defined British Prime Minister Blair, and could be recognised in the style of Japan's recent 
Prime Minister Koizumi.44  When Hawke lost a leadership battle with his treasurer Paul 
Keating in 1991, the environment fell as an issue of government concern, with the 
dismantling of key institutions and processes despite public protest.45  This was critical for 
greenhouse policy in terms of Hawke's aspirations being replaced by Keating's lack of interest 
and his contentedness to let industry act voluntarily, which then became a key plank in the 
Howard government's approach.46 
 
The Kyoto Challenge - from leader to laggard 
Australia had been an early accepter of the concept of developed nations acting first on 
greenhouse gas reduction despite the associated costs.  Its early commitments were ambitious, 
but untested, prior to domestic efforts, and even then tied to economic and trade based 
caveats.47  Policy shifted under Keating, at the first Conference of Parties (COP1) to the 
UNFCCC in Berlin, in 1995, with Australia fighting targets, emphasizing costs, calling for 
differentiation, and no longer accepting developed nation responsibility.  Australia's 'leader to 
laggard' shift was entrenched at the 1996 COP2 in Geneva by the newly elected Howard 
coalition government.  Australia made a serious effort, with an attitude noted as positively 
hostile, to derail the Kyoto process, questioning IPCC science, opposing legally binding 
targets and advocating differentiation for itself.48  It went armed with economic analysis to 
prove its case as atypically vulnerable to emission reduction as a carbon intensive nation.  
This analysis was later found by the Commonwealth Ombudsman to have been improperly 
funded by the fossil fuel industry and undertaken by a research body whose membership 
included energy industry leaders but which actively excluded environmentalists.49  The 
analysis stated that reductions proposed would cause GDP to decline 2%, with each 
Australian $AUD 9,000 worse off, and the loss of tens of thousands of jobs.  The per capita 
                                                
43 Macdonald, 2005a, 221. 
44 See Tiberghien and Scheurs, this issue. 
45 Economou, 1999, 71. 
46 Hamilton, 1999, 38-42. 
47 Following the 1988 Toronto Conference on Climate Change, the 1989 Hague Summit, and the 1990 World 
Climate Conference in Geneva, Australia committed to stabilise greenhouse gas emissions at 1988 levels by 
2000, and reduce emissions by 20% by 2005 (Hamilton, 2001, 32; Macdonald, 2005a, 221; Taplin, 1995, 17). 
48 Macdonald, 2005a, 225. 
49 Commonwealth Ombudsman, 1998. 131 Australian economists also signed a statement that this analysis 
overstated Australia's case (Hamilton, 2001, 56). 
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economic cost would be 22 times higher for Australia than for the EU, six times higher than 
for the US, and would see wages reduced 20% by 2020.50 
Whilst the COP2 in Geneva established the need for a legally binding treaty, it left 
open the possibility of different targets for individual countries.  Australia argued at the 1997 
COP3 in Kyoto against binding targets and against the need for countries to either cut back or 
reverse the prevailing upward trends in greenhouse gas emissions.51  It no longer accepted the 
basic 'Kyoto rationale' of a three-step process: that is, i) stopping emissions growth, ii) cutting 
emissions, and lastly iii) forging a global regime by involving developing nations.52  Instead, 
Australia emphasized its special case argument, again drawing international and domestic 
criticism.53  Ian Lowe gives a compelling first hand account of Australia's behaviour, which 
Clive Hamilton observes was embarrassing for other Australians, with even the US criticising 
Australia's spoiling efforts.54   Other governments were scandalised by its irresponsible stance, 
bringing talks to the brink of collapse, until a closed door late night session agreed at 3 am to 
Australia's differentiated target, and at 4 am to include allowances for changes in land use.55  
So Australia did achieve its +8% target and critical 'Australia clause', but its all-night ruse 
only succeeded in the end due to the parties' goal of achieving unanimous agreement. 
 
Differentiation Achieved - the heat is on 
Australia was broadly perceived to have played a wrecking, self-interested role in Kyoto, and 
whilst some may wonder why it persisted, it did as a consequence end up with concessions 
that would allow its critical energy emissions to continue to burgeon.  Australia's wrecking 
role apparently continued into 2000 at COP6 at the Hague, Netherlands, when talks between 
UNFCCC parties collapsed without agreement on how to implement Kyoto, in part because 
Australia and the US wanted to broaden the definition of a 'carbon sink'.56  Australia argued 
for the definition of acceptable carbon-dioxide-absorbing forests to be extended to include 
vegetation such as salt-bush, planted to alleviate salinity, and non-native exotics, a position 
opposed by environmentalists.  Indeed it was reported that pot-plants ended up dotting the 
                                                
50 ABARE, 1997; Lyster, 2004, 564. 
51 Papadakis, 2002, 265. 
52 Lowe, 2004, 262. 
53 Papadakis, 2002, 265. 
54 Hamilton, 2001; Macdonald, 2005a, 226. 
55 Lowe, 2004, 259-60. 
56 The United States withdrew from negotiations in March 2001 following the election of George Bush. 
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Hague during the talks with signs denoting them as Australian 'sinks'.57  The COP6 resumed 
in Bonn in 2001, where the parties agreed at last on the extensive use of flexibility 
mechanisms.  Australia's Environment Minister declared that the concessions Australia had 
gained would mean that it would not have to do anything new, like actually cutting 
emissions,58 which suggests that land use concessions alone would suffice in meeting 
Australia's +8% target.  The difference between this target and Australia's projected BAU 
emissions (even including the land-use mechanism) was not mentioned, suggesting either that 
the Minister was underplaying the abatement efforts that would be required to reduce 
emissions below BAU, or that the BAU estimate was inflated and irrelevant. 
By the conclusion of COP7 in Marrakesh, after the withdrawal of the US, Australia 
had achieved the outcomes it had been seeking on the definition of carbon sinks which refer 
to growing forests, re-afforestation, improved forestry, cropland and grazing land 
management.  These outcomes included no restrictions of credits from afforestation and 
reforestation, the inclusion of revegetation as a sink activity, and no penalties for new fast 
growing short rotation forest plantations.  It was decided, however, that no sink credits could 
be carried beyond 2012.59  Despite achieving its concessions, Australia announced in 2002, 
after the re-election of the Howard government, that it would not ratify Kyoto but pursue its 
own course based upon a dual doctrine of 'differentiation' or special treatment for Australia 
and 'no regrets' or no cost policies. Kyoto came into force on 16 June 2005 after Russia 
ratified.  Australia has since been tracking its +8% Kyoto target in an attempt to demonstrate 
that non-parties can take effective action, and remains a UNFCCC party with accounting and 
reporting obligations. As a non-party to Kyoto, however, Australia has been freely pursuing 
its own interests within its region.  It has been promoting the Asian Pacific Partnership on 
Clean Development and Energy (AP6), which is a proposed trade based regional regime 
without emission reduction targets, and which Australia hoped would succeed Kyoto, but 
which it now concedes is at best complementary to it.60 
 
Post Kyoto Partners - leadership regained? 
Australia intensified its criticism of Kyoto after it came into force, as a way of deflecting 
concern that it was now a non-party, with the Environment Minister dismissing it as a 
                                                
57 The Australian, 22 November, 2000; Macdonald, 2005a, 228.  Article 3.3 of the Protocol does define a forest 
tree as exceeding 2 meters, but land use clearing and change is much less well defined, although allometric 
equations have been defined for estimating vegetation biomass (AGO, 2005b). 
58 Macdonald, 2005a, 228. 
59 Roarty, 2002, 5. 
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'political stunt, not a serious way of addressing the issue'.61  Australia's implicit rejection of 
environmental multilateralism was much criticised, and countered by Australia's pursuit of the 
AP6 arrangement with the US, Japan, China, India and Korea.  Australia argues that these 
nations account for 50% of global emissions, whereas Kyoto covers only 25% of global 
emissions and is not a global regime, thereby ignoring the global intent of the second 
commitment period.62  Essentially the AP6 is a pragmatic arrangement that suits Australia, 
and that promotes specific trade benefits for its partners.  It embodies the region's material 
and security interests, resource endowments, and development needs, and promotes market 
liberalism over regulatory approaches to climate change.  This is a 'mini-lateral' effort, 
Kellow argues, which has been precipitated by the Kyoto Protocol imposing costs, not 
benefits, on participating nations, while failing to meet its own targets, and failing to offer a 
way beyond 2012.  It is not possible here to explore the viability and effectiveness of the 
Kyoto Protocol, but it is worth reflecting that Australia's resistance to it is motivated, Kellow 
argues, by Kyoto's Eurocentrism which is unsuited to the Asian Pacific.63 
 It will take some time for any Australian government to salvage its reputation on 
climate change given the stance of the Howard government and its consistent pursuit of 
economic interest.  The AP6 may provide a useful forum for regional dialogue, but it is not 
defined by a genuine philosophy of abatement, nor a sense of moral responsibility for 
developed nations to act first.  It may also stumble given the refusal of the US Congress to 
approve funding for it, with Republican Senator John McCain's dismissing the AP6 as a 
public relations ploy.64  Australia's pursuit of the AP6 does show that it is looking for a 
solution that suits its economic interests, that is free of adverse trade and employment effects, 
and that promotes its energy industry.  It is convinced that Kyoto will fail without the US, and 
without early involvement by the developing nations, but its tactics may encourage those 
nations to adopt self-interested, concession-seeking behaviour as they join the regime.  Given 
the politics of Australia's non-ratification, it would be surprising if the government's domestic 
policy efforts over the last decade had asserted any environmental principles over economic 
imperatives.  The lack of pressure on the issue at federal elections has left the Prime Minister 
a 'Kyoto recalcitrant' and climate change sceptic, entirely unswayed by public sentiment, and 
making policy deals with a minor party only once in that whole time. However, with the 
                                                                                                                                                   
60 Hamilton, 2007, 223. 
61 Macdonald, 2005a, 228. 
62 The regime will only reduce global emissions 1%, not the 60% that is needed by 2050 (AGO, 2004). 
63 Kellow, 2006, 287. On the viability of Kyoto, see Depledge, 2006. 
64 Hamilton, 2007, 190. 
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recent rise in salience of climate change among the electorate, there is now significant 
pressure for radical policy change. 
 
 
Australian Abatement Policies, Programs and Actions  
What has Australia done then to address climate change, and how effective have its actions 
been?  Most significantly, it has committed to meeting its +8% Kyoto target.  The latest 
tracking of the target is shown in Table 1, which is aggregated from recent data sets, and 
indicatively65 reflects the significance of land use accounting in Australia's 1990 baseline.  
Hence the claim by critics that Australia is on track to achieving its target without having to 
cut energy emissions, indeed with energy increases being offset by significant land clearing 
decreases since 1990.  Reporting to the UNFCCC documents actual progress on emission 
change, which is most recently shown in Table 1 by the 2003 column, with another report and 
progress update expected late in 2008.66  On the basis of the 2003 information, it can be seen 
that emissions due to land use, land use change and forestry have dropped from 129MtCo2-e 
in 1990 to only 6MtCo2-e in 2003.  In the energy sector, which includes transport, there has 
been an increase in the period from 287 to 374 MtCo2-e, whilst there has been little significant 
change in the other sectors.  Reporting on the tracking of the Kyoto target by the AGO 
released in 2006 claims that Australia's greenhouse policy measures will result in 88 MtCo2-e 
of abatement from BAU by 2010.  Even so, energy and industrial emissions will increase 
150%, offset by plunging land use change. 
 
Table 1. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and projections (Mt Co2-e), 1990, 2003, 201067  
Sector 1990  2003 2010 
abatement 
2010  
BAU 
2010 with 
measures 
% of 1990 
Energy 287 374 46 476 430 150 
       Stationary      196      268       35       341         306      156 
       Transport       62      80         2        89         86      140 
       Fugitive from fuel       30       26         8        46          38       127 
Industrial Processes 25 32 8 46 38 150 
Agriculture 91 97 1 96 96 105 
Waste 19 11 12 28 16 81 
Sub Total 422 514 67 646 580  
       
Land Use, Land Use 
Change and Forestry 
12968 6 21 44 24 35 
                                                
65 The reason that this is an indicative table is that data sets vary between reporting periods as accounting 
processes are enhanced and change.  It is difficult to reconcile the data sets and the changes between them. 
66 Note that the difference between the original BAU projection and the current projections lies in part in the 
assumed future impact of existing government policies. 
67 This data relies on the AGO (AGO 2005a, 2006, ABS 2006). Columns may not add due to rounding. 
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       Forest Lands      0       0          ne69          -21                -21       0 
       Land Use Change      129        6          21           65            45        ne 
       
Total Net Emissions 552 521 88 690 603 521 
 
Australia's most recent report to the UNFCCC breaks down the estimate of mitigation impact 
in cross-sectoral and sectoral reporting.  Abatement efforts in the energy sector are of 
considerable significance, and analysis shows that the projected cuts in this sector from BAU 
will be achieved by abatement of 47MtCo2-e (i.e. 37.6MtCo2-e in stationary energy, 2.2 
MtCo2-e in transport and 7.2 MtCo2-e in fugitive emissions).  The interesting features of this 
projected abatement include that the federal and state governments will contribute equally to 
abatement in stationary energy, with greenhouse gas abatement in New South Wales alone 
matching the entire federal government effort.  And for all the rhetoric about 
intergovernmental cooperation, there is very little actual projected abatement from 
intergovernmental programs addressing stationary energy, with only 3.3 MtCo2-e projected to 
be achieved from energy efficiency and local action programs.  The other interesting feature 
of the reporting is program type, with state programs, (comprising 20 MtCo2-e of the 
projected 47MtCo2-e abatement in the energy sector), being entirely regulatory.  Of the 
federal government programs, those that are basically voluntary account for approximately 
20MtCo2-e, and include the Greenhouse Challenge programs for industry, green power and 
energy efficiency programs.  The Mandatory Renewable Energy Program, explained below, is 
the stand-out federal government regulatory program but with a projected abatement of only 
6.6 MtCo2-e. 70 
 A further significant aspect to the legitimacy of the Howard government's abatement 
efforts is the baseline information and the BAU projections to 2010, which are revised 
between reports to the UNFCCC and reports by the AGO.  This occurs as accounting methods 
between reporting periods are revised and change, and presumably as new abatement 
measures come on line with anticipated future impact.  In terms of context, the Howard 
government's resting of its abatement policy on the principle of 'no regrets', or no economic 
cost, has led to its narrow emphasis upon spending and voluntary programs.  Hunt argues that 
this has been inefficient and taxpayer-burdensome, and should be replaced by an economy-
                                                                                                                                                   
68 The LULUCF baseline is hugely significant to meeting the Kyoto target and has previously been reported at 
85.9Mt not 129Mt.  Improved accounting methods may account for the difference in figures, as the AGO claims, 
however the revised baseline makes it easier for Australia to meet its Kyoto target. 
69 Not estimated. 
70 AGO, 2005a, Chapter Four. 
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wide tax or permit trading scheme that would price emissions.71  Indeed for a government 
committed to market liberalism, it is surprising that it has not done this, but that it has instead 
sheltered the coal industry and energy production from market forces and restructuring for so 
many years.72  In terms of other policy contexts, the states are responsible for emission 
reductions in transport, land use, planning, energy use and supply, and Australia as a non-
party to the Protocol has had no access to Kyoto market mechanisms and international carbon 
trading.  Key programs under the Howard government have been the 1997 Safeguarding the 
Future Package, the 1998 National Greenhouse Strategy, the 1999 Measures for a Better 
Environment Package, and 2004 Securing Australia's Energy Future measures (Table 2).73 
 
Table 2. Australian Policies and Programs 1996-0674 
Safeguarding the Future: Australia's Response to Climate Change 1997  
This program establishes the Australian Greenhouse Office,75 the extension of the Labor government's voluntary 
Greenhouse Challenge program for industry, the MRET, the renewable energy equity fund and 
commercialisation program, energy efficiency measures in building and appliance codes, motor vehicle fuel 
efficiencies, plans to treble Australia's forest plantations by 2020, and support for local government uptake of the 
Cities for Climate Protection program. 
The National Greenhouse Strategy 1998  
This strategy updates and replaces Labor's Strategy and is consistent with the principles of cooperative 
government namely cooperative decision making, reduced intergovernmental conflict and more certainty in 
decision making.  Besides reducing duplication in abatement efforts, it aims to ensure policies, programs and 
actions are coordinated.  Implementation focuses on i) improving public awareness and understanding of 
greenhouse issues, ii) limiting greenhouse gas emissions; and iii) developing adaptation responses. 
Measures for a Better Environment 1999  
This funding package reflects the Australian Democrat's renewable energy and energy efficiency priorities by 
providing for cost-effective, large-scale greenhouse gas abatement, particularly in substantial emissions 
reduction or substantial sink enhancement, renewable energy capacity for remote communities especially 
indigenous communities, funding for photovoltaic systems with subsidies for solar hot water, and to promote 
commercialisation of renewable energy, alternative fuel usage and household energy reduction. 
Securing Australia's Energy Future 2004  
Additional measures announced since 1999 take the federal spending to AUD$2 billion, including measures in 
the 2004 Energy White Paper (Kemp and Downer 2004) and measures announced in the 2004-05 federal budget 
some of which appear to overlap with previous programs and may involve extensions.  Included is AUD$334.4 
million for reducing Australia's greenhouse emissions, AUD$500 million for low-emission technologies, 
AUD$100 million for renewable technologies and AUD$75 million for demonstration Solar Cities. 
 
No Regrets Policy Approaches 1997-07  
In historical terms, the Howard government has maintained the Keating Labor government's 
spending, voluntary, research and information emphasis in climate change policy.  It has 
boosted spending from AUD$180 million in 1997 to over $2.5 billion during the 1997-2007 
                                                
71 Hunt, 2004, 156; Campbell, 2006. 
72 Part of the current heightened attention to climate change will likely see a government reversal on this. 
73 AGO, 2004, 12; Kemp and Downer, 2004. 
74 AGO, 2004; Campbell, 2006; CWLTH, 2004; Kemp and Downer, 2004; Lyster, 2004. 
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decade.  In comparative terms, this is at the lower end of spending by developed countries, at 
$4 per capita, similar to Canada, but well below the US and Japan.76  Spending efforts have 
also been criticised by the Australian National Audit Agency as inadequate, ineffective, and 
inefficiently managed, and not likely to deliver significant greenhouse gas emission 
reductions.77  The government has also ignored advice by a Senate Review Committee to go 
beyond no regrets measures.78  There are several themes in the criticism of the government's 
approach.  These include concern over: the lack of measures tackling burgeoning energy 
emissions; the government's focus on protection of the coal industry; its failure to support 
alternative energy; and its 'touching belief' that clean coal is possible.79  There are further 
concerns about slow, inadequate policy implementation, haphazard planning, lack of 
integration of greenhouse objectives into other policy, and slow progress in gaining 
agreement on state measures.80  Voluntarism has been criticised as light-handed, weak and 
ineffective, with an inability to provoke more than 10% of publicly listed companies to take 
action, and parallelled by such steep rises in emissions from the energy sector as to question 
its impact at all.81 
Table 2 also reflects the failure of the Howard government to introduce a national 
emissions cap and trading scheme (which it has previously rejected for not covering its 
competitors), or to introduce carbon taxes (which the government has ruled out as punitive).  
The key federal regulatory measure, as mentioned, is the Mandatory Renewable Energy 
Program, introduced in 1998, which encourages renewable energy generation, emissions 
abatement and the sustainability of renewable energy sources.  This is aimed at electricity 
wholesalers and large users to increase the relative share of all electricty generated from 
renewable sources by an additional 2%, or 9,500 gigawatt hours, per annum by 2010, with the 
2% target to be maintained till 2020.82  Other regulatory measures in Table 2 refer to a broad 
range of appliance and efficiency standards, building codes, labelling schemes, fuel quality 
regulations and licensing agreements mostly introduced in cooperation with the states.  
Pressure to adopt domestic emissions trading has come from two of the government's own 
                                                                                                                                                   
75 Included in the Howard government's early fiscal efforts was the establishment in 1998 of this world's first 
national greenhouse office as the key agency on greenhouse matters, dedicated to cutting greenhouse gas 
emissions with responsibilities including whole of government policy coordination and program delivery. 
76 Pollard, 2003. 
77 Four years after seven programs were announced, the Australian National Audit Office found that 71.1% of 
the original budget estimates had been committed, but only 23.4% had actually been spent, ANAO, 2004. 
78 CWLTH, 2000; Lyster, 2004, 574 
79 Lowe, 2004, 262. 
80 CWLTH, 2000. 
81 Taplin, 2004, 498; CWLTH, 2000; KPMG, 2006; The Australian, 28 July, 2005.  
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environment ministers, in 2000 and in 2003, as well as from the states which may establish 
their own scheme, and most recently from the International Energy Agency.  In November 
2006, the Prime Minister finally bowed to pressure and established a joint government-
business task force on emissions trading, which in February 2007 supported the establishment 
of a domestic cap and trade scheme.83  Energy emissions, in short, are burgeoning under the 
government’s no regrets policy regime, BAU cuts are not assured, and spending and 
voluntarism have failed therefore as effective emission abatement measures. 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS  
This paper has considered Australia's position on climate change in the international context 
and the legitimacy of its domestic efforts and has attempted to explain why it resists Kyoto, 
yet embraces and pursues Kyoto targets.  It has established that abatement has not only 
proven challenging, but that it is more easily avoided by reliance upon concessions that 
Australia gained in Kyoto negotiations to include land use and change emissions in its 1990 
baseline.  This has allowed the Howard government to rely on the halting of land clearing to 
offset soaring energy emissions in the first commitment period, but still be able to claim that 
it is meeting its +8% target.  On the other hand, the federal government's voluntary and 
spending policies, its avoidance of effective regulatory measures, and the influence of the 
fossil fuel industry over energy policy, will likely thwart projected cuts in business as usual 
emissions by 2012.  That the government is avoiding responsibility for effective abatement is 
illustrated best in the energy sector where half of the projected cuts in emissions will be 
achieved by just one state government.  Australia was not well positioned to ratify the 
Protocol in 2002.  By this time, it had become abundantly clear the role that land use and 
change concessions were playing in avoiding energy emissions cuts.  Had Australia ratified, it 
would have been faced with a second commitment period with no concessions, in which cuts 
to energy emissions, confrontation not only with business interests, trade unions and coal rich 
state governments, would have been unavoidable. 
Australia is the highest greenhouse gas emitter per capita in the world, albeit 
contributing only marginally to global emissions, but it has clearly placed national self-
interest before multilateral abatement effort.  However it has been argued here that economic 
interest only partially explains its non-ratification politics and its much criticised policy 
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efforts on climate change.  Fossil fuel industry interests have dominated and best aligned with 
the Prime Minister's own climate change scepticism, and his conservative government's 
economic rationalism and regional trade concerns.  That the Howard government has 
withstood strong normative pressure, at home and abroad, to ratify Kyoto, restructure the 
energy industry, and significantly reduce emissions, is testimony to how politically secure it 
has been over its decade so far in power.  Indeed this paper has found only modest 
institutional influences upon climate change politics and government policy in that time, 
through the actions of minor parties in the Senate and reviews by agencies, independent 
bodies and committees.  If the Howard government has been faking its climate change efforts, 
relying on land clearance reductions to cover burgeoning energy emissions, and ineffectively 
targeting and funding its own policies, it has not affected its electoral success.  Indeed it has 
behaved as a classic self-interested state, signing onto the Kyoto Protocol in 1997, and 
thereby committing to the principal of global emissions reductions, but only on the basis that 
its own emissions were able to increase or it would walk away.  Its legacy of inaction and 
intransigence since then will make effective abatement action all the more difficult after 2012. 
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